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1. Introduction 
On June 23 2015 the UK voted to leave the European Union and on October 5 2016 the Prime 
Minister, Theresa May, announced at the Conservative Party conference that the UK would invoke 
the procedure for leaving under Art.50 of the Treaty on European Union by the end of March 20171. 
She also announced that the Government would take the further concrete step of proposing a 
“Great Repeal Bill” in the next Parliamentary sessions to repeal the European Communities Act 1972, 
which provides the domestic legal basis for the application of EU law. These developments leading to 
a future “Brexit” from the EU obviously have potential significance for the law and policy governing 
public procurement in the UK. The aim of this article is to consider the potential impact of Brexit in 
relation to three main questions in this area.  
The first is the extent to which Brexit will lead to the dismantling of legal constraints on the use of 
procurement to promote and support national industry – the industrial policy aspect. Currently such 
strategic use of procurement is constrained for most domestic contracts by the EU rules, the very 
purpose of which is to open up national markets to EU-wide competition2. Thus for all contracts of 
cross-border interest industrial policy measures are largely ruled out by the rules of the TFEU, which 
prohibit discrimination in public procurement and do not make exceptions for national industrial 
development measures, even those targeted at particular industries or regions (such as preferences 
for firms in undeveloped areas)3. Similar limitations derive also from the fact that the UK – by virtue 
of its EU membership – is a Party to the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement 2012 
(GPA)4, and under that Agreement offers other Parties non-discriminatory access to most major 
public contracts, and from other trade agreements to which the UK is party, again by virtue of its EU 
membership. The key question so far as this aspect of procurement policy is concerned is the extent 
to which both EU membership itself and the trade agreements that come with it will be replaced or 
duplicated by new agreements that impose the same, or similar, procurement regimes.   
A second question is the potential impact on the freedom to use procurement to promote and 
support social and environmental goals – the social and environmental policy aspect. There are again 
significant legal constraints on this deriving from EU law5, both from prohibitions against 
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1 See “Theresa May’s keynote speech at Tory conference in full”, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-
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Procurement Law (2011) pp.148-158. 
4 See generally S. Arrowsmith and R. D. Anderson (eds), The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and 
Reform (CUP, 2011). 
5 There is a vast literature on this topic; for general works on the legal aspects see, in particular, S. Arrowsmith and P. 
Kunzlik (eds), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law (CUP 2011); J.M. Fernández Martín, The EC Public 
Procurement Rules: a Critical Analysis (OUP, 1996), Chs 2 and 3; R. Caranta and M. Trybus (eds), The Law of Green and 
Social Procurement in Europe (Djøf Publishing; 2010) ; D. Dragos and “Sustainable Public Procurement in the EU: 
Experiences and Prospects”, in F.Lichère. R. Caranta and S. Treumer (eds.), Modernising Public Procurement: the New 
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discrimination and the EU’s procedural rules that support the open market policy, in particular in the 
procurement Directives which govern major contracts6. With only limited exceptions7, the Directives 
preclude most policies that deal with a supplier’s behaviour outside the contract being awarded8, 
except when debarment from procurement contracts is a judicially-imposed sanction for legal 
violations9; and they also control the way in which different mechanisms – contractual conditions, 
award criteria etc – are used in implementing policies linked directly to contractual performance. 
Similar constraints exist under the GPA, although their exact impact is less certain and probably less 
extensive10, and again the GPA does not apply to all procurement covered by EU rules. More general 
EU measures relating to social and environmental policy also affect public procurement in a 
significant way, either because they impose very specific constraints and/or because they oblige 
Member States to address various social or environmental objectives; these include the Acquired 
Rights Directive11 (implemented in the TUPE Regulations12), the Posted Workers Directive13, and 
certain directives on energy-efficiency of government purchases14. This use of procurement to 
promote social and environmental goals is a topic of great current interest given the recent 
emphasis placed on this by the UK administrations15.  
The third and final question relates to the role of the law in regulating award procedures and related 
supplier remedies. In this regard, as observed, the EU regime, the GPA and also other trade 
agreements impose specified award procedures, from advertising through selection and exclusion to 
the final award; and these are enforceable by suppliers in accordance with review procedures that 
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6 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement and repealing Directive 
2004/18/EC [2014] O.J. L 94/65 (2014 Public Contracts Directive); Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing 
Directive 2004/17/EC [2014] O.J. L 94/243 (2014 Utilities Directive); Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the award of concession contracts [2014] O.J. L 94/1 (2014 Concessions Directive); Directive 2009/81/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of certain 
works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and 
security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC [2009] O.J. L216/76 (Defence and Security Directive). 
Remedies are dealt with in Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21.12.1989 on the co-ordination of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions relating to the application of review procedures to the award of public supply and public works 
contracts [1989] O.J. L395/33 (Remedies Directive), Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25.2.92 co-ordinating the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, [1992] O.J. L76/14 (Utilities Remedies 
Directive) (for contracts covered by the 2014 Utilities Directive), and in Directive 2009/81 for contracts falling within that 
directive.   
7 Notably rules allowing set asides for sheltered employment programmes e.g. 2014 Public Contracts Directive Art. 20. 
8 See, for example, 2014 Public Contracts Directive Art.67(2) and Art.70 requiring award criteria and contract conditions 
respectively to be linked to the subject matter of the contract; and Art.57)6) providing for a self-cleaning defence against 
exclusions that links the power of exclusion to reliability. 
9 See, for example, 2014 Public Contracts Directive Art.57(6) final para., limiting use of the self-cleaning defence. 
10 See S. Arrowsmith, Government Procurement in the WTO (2003; Kluwer Law International), Ch.13;  S. Arrowsmith and R. 
D. Anderson (eds), The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform (CUP; 2011), Part V. 
11 Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or 
businesses [2001] O.J. L82/16. 
12 Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Protection Regulations 2006 SI 2006/246. 
13 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of 
workers in the framework of the provision of services [1997] O.J. L 18/1. 
14 Directive 2009/33/EC on promoting clean, energy-efficient road vehicles [2009] O.J. L120/5, Art.5(1)-(2); and an 
obligation to purchase energy efficient products under Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing 
Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC Text [2012] L 315/1 
15 As discussed later below. 
must meet certain minimum standards. The EU rules on these matters originated mainly in the 
desire to secure a minimum level of transparency to prevent states from concealing decisions that 
favour national industry16. To this end the EU adopted the Directives referred to above to regulate 
procedures for contracts above certain financial thresholds and this later inspired the European 
Court of Justice (CJEU) to develop transparency rules under the TFEU for all contracts of cross-
border interest17, even those outside the Directives. In general the Directives’ rules, since they are 
intended to be enforceable by third parties – suppliers - must be transposed into the national legal 
order by a method providing for legally enforceable rights within the domestic system18. Before 
implementing these procurement Directives in the manner required by the EU, the UK did not have a 
significant body of public procurement law at all, at least not law that was legally enforceable by 
suppliers19. Procurement was regulated nationally to foster domestic goals, in particular to promote 
value for money and prevent corruption, but mainly through administrative instructions and 
guidance rather than legal rules20. An enforceable body of law was created mainly by the national 
regulations that gave effect to the Directives, which – after a false start by attempting to 
implementation through the traditional “administrative” method of regulation (instructions in 
administrative circulars), which did not comply with EU requirements for a legal form21 - was done 
from 1991 onwards22 through regulations adopted under the European Communities Act 1972.  
These were then adapted to give effect also to obligations under the other trade agreements, 
including the GPA23. These regulations still represent the vast bulk of UK procurement law24. Thus 
“UK public procurement law” has always been for the most part “EU procurement law as applied in 
the UK”. Whilst the purpose of this EU-based law has been to open up UK markets to tenderers from 
other Member States25, in practice the EU rules, in providing for transparent award procedures, also 
contribute towards national goals of value for money etc. The questions which Brexit raises in this 
regard are whether the UK will retain the current, somewhat complex, set of regulations, or will 
instead adopt quite different – possibly more simple – rules, or will even resort to the historical 
approach of regulating procurement primarily by administrative instruments.  
 
Reflecting the fact that current law and policy on all three aspects derives to a large extent from EU 
rules and from other trade agreements on procurement which depend on EU membership, the 
impact of Brexit depends significantly on the outcome of negotiations to replace the existing trade 
arrangements. Procurement will not, of course, be considered in isolation from other areas of trade, 
and even should the UK wish to adopt a less liberal view in negotiations on procurement than on 
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other areas, in order to use procurement as a policy tool – and there is no clear indication of this - its 
ability to do so, especially in negotiations with the EU, may be constrained, as we will see. The main 
problem in analysing the possible impact of Brexit is, of course, that the outcome of these general 
negotiations remains highly speculative, depending on controversial and as yet mainly unknown 
political decisions. 
 
A few clues to the UK’s own approach emerged in the speech by Theresa May at the October 2016 
Conservative party conference26. This indicated, first, a commitment to free trade in both goods and 
services, and more generally to a “Global Britain”. However, so far as relations with the EU itself are 
concerned, the Prime Minister also indicated that the UK will not be prepared to give up “control 
over immigration”, which will limit the realistic prospects for negotiating full access to the EU’s single 
market. References to a liberal trade policy with both the EU and other partners were also further 
tempered by reference to developing an industrial policy which, rather ambiguously, was said not to 
be about “picking winners, propping up failing industries, or bringing old companies back from the 
dead” but “identifying the industries that are of strategic value to our economy and promoting and 
supporting them through policies on trade, tax, infrastructure, skills, training and research and 
development”. The distinction between picking winners, which is rejected, and supporting industries 
of strategic value through trade policy, is not immediately apparent, although it is clear that the 
main thrust of policy is intended to be towards developing the new and/or successful rather than 
rescuing the declining and/or old industries.  
 
These pronouncements clarify the likely direction of negotiations only to a limited extent and are far 
from irrevocable, so that speculation as to the likely outcome is still very premature. Rather than 
making specific predictions, the present article will thus proceed mainly by outlining different 
options, indicating some of the practical and legal considerations, both positive and negative, which 
might influence their adoption, and considering in general terms their implications for each of the 
three different aspects of procurement referred to above. The article does not address individual 
areas of social and environmental policy, but the issues relating to the Acquired Right Directive/TUPE 
are considered in a separate article in this issue of the Review27.  
 
The article also limits its focus to relationships with EU and GPA partners, since these are almost 
certain to be the main or only focus of the immediate negotiations, and thus the relationships which 
will shape UK procurement policy. As noted above, the UK is also party to many other trade 
agreements covering procurement28 which Brexit will bring to an end and which the UK may wish to 
replace. However, it seems unlikely that these will be an immediate priority or that the UK will 
constrain itself to any great extent over award procedures and remedies unless it is anyway bound 
to do so by its EU and GPA partners.  
 
As will be explained, one realistic possibility is a trade agreement with the EU - through the EEA or 
otherwise - that provides for continued application of the EU procurement regime to the UK, in 
which case Brexit would have few consequences. Another distinct possibility, however, is an 
agreement with the EU and/or other trading partners based solely on the GPA. This would not much 
loosen the current constraints on using major procurement as an industrial policy tool and would 
probably have only limited and uncertain implications for promoting social and environmental 
policies through procurement, although it would provide freedom of action in some areas (notably 
low-value procurement and hard defence procurement) that are outside the GPA. However, it could 
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xxx. We will also not consider other areas of law that affect public procurement but which are less significant on a day to 
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28These are outlined later below. 
have a major impact on procedural aspects, since it will significantly increase national autonomy on 
these matters, as well as affecting the remedies regime. We will argue that this would present a 
significant opportunity for better regulation, which should be based on a single and simple approach 
for all regulated procurement with more flexible procedures; and, indeed, the opportunity that the 
GPA-based approach presents in this regard provides a strong argument for the UK to opt for such 
an approach if it is realistically available. A third, although unlikely, scenario is that the UK does not 
conclude any agreements on public procurement, either intentionally or because negotiations fail.  
This would mean complete national flexibility over industrial and social /environmental aspects, as 
well as procedures and remedies. This would give rise to the possibility of either devising a new 
regulatory system, again with possibilities for better regulation, or of jettisoning the use of law as a 
regulatory tool altogether. How the UK would actually respond is, however, difficult to predict. The 
greater freedom of action under the last two options may well also involve a step backwards so far 
as simplicity is concerned by producing greater divergence between the regimes of England, Wales, 
Northern Ireland and Scotland, as well as “local” protectionism. 
 
We will consider in turn these different possibilities and their variations. We will look first at the 
possibility of EEA membership or similar (the “Norway” option) (section 2), secondly at the 
possibility of a bespoke trade agreement (section 3), thirdly at the “GPA” option (section 4) and, 
finally, at the possibility that there will be no trade agreement at all (section 5). We will also consider 
the likely timing of any changes (section 6). Finally, we will summarise the conclusions reached 
(section 7).   
 
2. EEA membership or equivalent - the “Norway option”: business (largely) as usual 
A first possibility that has been widely discussed is that the UK leaves the EU but remains party to 
the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement – a possibility often referred to in the UK media and 
debate29 pre-referendum as the “Norway option”. This may be opposed by EFTA states, which are 
currently all small states and may be concerned with a lack of balance with such a large partner, but  
a similar possibility might be for the UK to conclude an EEA-type arrangement just with the EU or 
with some of the other EEA states. The EEA effectively applies the same rules on public procurement 
as the EU does, and thus under these scenarios it would be pretty much business as usual for public 
procurement. 
First concluded in 199230, the EEA Agreement31, is an agreement applying to the EU Member States 
(including the UK) and certain states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Norway, 
Iceland, and Liechtenstein, which creates a single market for all these countries. (Switzerland is also 
a member of EFTA but declined to join the EEA.) The EEA Agreement does this, essentially, by 
applying the EU’s single market rules to the whole of the EEA. EEA members get access to a single 
market and provide access for other EEA members to their own markets, effectively on the basis of 
EU single market rules, whilst rules on certain other issues also apply, including (of relevance for 
                                                          
29 For an example see the contribution of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), “The Norway option”, at 
http://www.cbi.org.uk/global-future/case_study06_norway.html 
30 By the EU as an Association Agreement under Art.310 EC (now Art. 217 TFEU): see [1994] O.J. L1/1. The original 
Agreement was later extended to cover Liechtenstein and the EEA Enlargement Agreements of 2004, 2007 and 2014 
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Council Decision 566/07 [2007] O.J. L 221/15 and Council Decision 343/14 [2014] O.J. L 170/31. 
31 The full text including updated Annexes and Protocols are available at http://www.efta.int/legal-texts/eea. See generally 
D. Chalmers, G Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law: Text and Materials (3rd ed. 2014), Ch.5A, pp.10-23 ; P. Eeckhout, 
EU External Relations Law, (Oxford, 2011), pp. 311-314; S. Norberg, "The Agreement on a European Economic Area" (1992) 
29 C.M.L. Rev. 1171; A.T.Laredo, "The EEA Agreement: an Overall View" (1992) 29 C.M.L. Rev. 1199; D. O'Keefe, "The 
Agreement on the European Economic Area" (1992) Legal Issues in European Integration 1. 
public procurement) competition law and the environment. The EEA Agreement does not, however, 
provide for application of EU-based rules on many other matters, including on agriculture, on 
fisheries, on taxation, on freedom, security and justice and on foreign and security policy32.  
 
In the field of procurement33, this means, first, that EU Member States must open up their public 
procurement markets to other EEA members in the same way as to their fellow EU Member States 
and that, similarly, the non-EU members of the EEA must open their own procurement markets to 
EU Member States, based on public procurement rules which parallel those of the EU.  
 
In this regard, the EEA Agreement, first, contains provisions on free movement and competition that 
parallel those in the TFEU34. So far as EU secondary legislation is concerned35, single market rules 
existing at the time of the EEA Agreement, including in the procurement Directives, were accepted 
as part of the EEA package. Rules in subsequent Directives apply only if adopted by the EEA Joint 
Committee, but there is a duty to align EEA law with EU law as closely as possible36 and the 
Committee has adopted all subsequent procurement Directives, including those of 201437. Under 
these rules the EU’s Official Journal serves as the medium for advertising procurements in all EEA 
states, not just EU Member States. Article 6 EEA provides for reception of all pre-EEA jurisprudence 
interpreting EU provisions which are "identical in substance" to those of EEA law; thus EEA 
provisions on free movement and procurement procedures are to be interpreted in the light of the 
pre-existing EU case law on those matters. There was no provision for automatic reception of later 
EU jurisprudence but in practice the EFTA Court, which effectively fulfils the role of the CJEU for the 
non-EU members of the EEA, generally applies the law as developed by the CJEU. Pursuant to these 
obligations in the EEA Agreement, the UK procurement regulations have been made enforceable by 
suppliers from all the EEA countries38. 
 
Were the UK to join the EEA, or to conclude some similar arrangement, there would thus be little 
change. UK markets would remain open to EEA members, curtailing to the same extent as at present 
the use of procurement as a tool of industrial, social or environmental policy, and the same rules on 
award procedures and remedies would continue to apply. The current procurement regulations that 
implement the EU Directives would no doubt be retained, with technical adjustments to reflect the 
UK’s new status.  
UK business would itself, of course, continue in turn to benefit from public procurement 
opportunities in other EEA states39 in the same way as at present. Further, since all the single market 
                                                          
32 http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-agreement/eea-basic-features. 
33 On the application of the EEA to public procurement see further C. Bock, "The EEA Agreement: Rules on Public 
Procurement" (1993) 2 P.P.L.R 136; M. Toikka, "Public Procurement in the EEA" (1993) 2 P.P.L.R. CS123; J. Schnitzer, "The 
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Agreements on Public Procurement” (2010) 10 Journal of Public Procurement 301. 
34 In particular, Art.4 EEA prohibits within the scope of the EEA Treaty, discrimination on grounds of nationality, parallel to 
Art.18 TFEU; Art.11 prohibits restrictions on the free movement of goods, paralleling Art.34 TFEU EU; whilst Arts 31 and 36 
guarantee the freedom to establish and freedom to provide services, paralleling Arts 49 and 56 TFEU. 
35 Note also that the EEA Agreement provides for adaptation of the EU rules to cover the EEA states, since the wording in 
the EU rules is based on the assumption that they only apply to EU Member States. The adaptations to the procurement 
directives are contained in Annex VI to the EEA Agreement. 
36 And failure to do so would result in suspension of market access in the relevant areas. On the adoption process see D. 
Chalmers, G Davies and G. Monti, European Union Law: Text and Materials (3rd ed. 2014), Ch.5A, pp.10-23 p.21. 
37 Decisions of the EEA Joint Committee No 97/2016 of 29 April 2016 amending Annex XVI (Procurement) to the EEA 
Agreement, available at http://www.efta.int/media/documents/legal-texts/eea/other-legal-documents/adopted-joint-
committee-decisions/2016%20-%20English/097-2016.pdf. 
38 Regarding non-EU suppliers see e.g. Public Contracts Regulations 2015 reg.89(1) and (2). 
39 It is also worth noting that access to third country markets might also possibly be negotiated on the basis of agreements 
already concluded by EFTA states through EFTA, although the UK would need to negotiate to be accepted separately for 
rules would apply, UK firms seeking public procurement business in other EEA states would benefit 
from these rules – for example, from not having to pay tariffs on goods imported for use in public 
procurement contracts and from rights to set up subsidiary companies in other states of the EEA. 
However, some new obstacles would apply: for example, the EEA does not create a customs union 
meaning, inter alia, that imported goods must go through customs procedures that can create 
practical barriers to trade.   
 
Some changes would, nevertheless, be seen, even under this option40. 
First, the UK would have no vote, and thus a significantly reduced voice, on future changes to the 
applicable rules. EEA states that are not EU members can often provide de facto input into the 
legislative process through participation in, for example, the European Commission’s governmental 
Advisory Committee on procurement, but influence is clearly limited when there are no voting 
rights. Further, as the CBI has stated “[EFTA] governments are often left out of the information loop 
and risk missing out on early-stage discussions when EU member states begin new initiatives or are 
formally consulted by the Commission”41. In the author’s experience the UK has played a significant 
and positive role in shaping EU procurement rules along commercial rather than bureaucratic lines, 
most notably in relation to the provisions on framework agreements and competitive dialogue that 
were introduced in 200442. The UK has also had influence in the introduction or adoption of 
measures of concern to the UK in the 2014 reform process, including the “mutuals” exemption 
(allowing a temporary reservation for public service organisations of certain contracts for health, 
cultural and social services)43 and the provision for wider use of award procedures involving 
negotiation44. Future amendments will apply only if explicitly adopted by the Joint Committee of the 
EEA45 (comprising both its EU members, in practice represented by the European Commission, and 
non-EU EEA members), but as noted above there is a duty to align EEA law with EU law as far as 
possible. 
In addition, the role of the European Commission in dealing with complaints and the role of the CJEU 
in hearing cases and giving interpretations would cease for the UK. For Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein largely the same functions are carried out by the EFTA Surveillance Authority and EFTA 
Court, with the EFTA Court in practice following CJEU interpretations as we noted above. If the UK 
were to join EFTA these EFTA institutions would also take this role for the UK. Were the EU and UK 
instead to include a separate EEA-type arrangement, similar appropriate institutional arrangements 
to deal with enforcement between will be needed. It is possibly questionable whether any of these 
enforcement arrangements would operate with the same rigour as those of the European 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
each agreement; alternatively it would remain free to concluded its own agreements should it choose to do so (which 
under the EU’s common commercial policy is not an option for EU Member States and hence for the UK at present). 
40 Other possible general differences may include less effective enforcement in national courts in cases in which the rules 
are not properly implemented by the national authorities: on this see D. Chalmers, G Davies and G. Monti, European Union 
Law: Text and Materials (3rd ed. 2014), Ch.5A, pp.17-20. 
41 CBI, “The Norway option”, at http://www.cbi.org.uk/global-future/case_study06_norway.html. 
42 These remarks are based on the author’s personal experiences of the evolution of the 2004 procurement directives, 
including as a member of the European Commission’s independent Advisory Committee for the Opening up of Public 
Procurement and as a participant in private meetings with European Commission functionnaires in the period during the 
drafting process and legislative procedure leading up to the 2004 directives, in which development of competitive dialogue 
and framework agreements were discussed. For further consideration of the influence of UK practice, and other factors, on 
the competitive dialogue procedure see S Arrowsmith and S. Treumer (eds.), Competitive Dialogue in EU Procurement 
(2012, CUP), pp.20-29 and pp.190-192.  
43 2014 Public Contracts Directive Art.77; 2014 Utilities Directive Art.94. 
44 As provided for in 2014 Public Contracts Directive Art.26. The new provisions providing for the possibility of aggregation 
of contracts for threshold purposes at the level of independent purchasing units rather than the procuring entity as a 
whole is also based on UK law and practice, embodied in provisions of the earlier procurement UK regulations relating to 
such “discrete operational units”, as they are referred to in the UK: see S. Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities 
Procurement (3rd ed. 2014), Vol.1, paras 6-124-6-128.  
45 See EEA Agreement Art.102. 
Commission within the EU46, however, making it less likely that current problems – such as the 
problems with the UK supplier remedies system which are discussed later below – will be addressed.  
Other than this institutional issue, if an EEA approach, or similar, is politically the preferred solution, 
reaching an agreement should from a technical perspective be relatively easy since it is essentially an 
“off the shelf” solution. However, the choice of such a solution is beginning to look increasingly 
unlikely from both sides. From the UK perspective, despite the Prime Minister’s recent assertion of 
the Government’s commitment to open trade, a major obstacle is that the EEA rules include full 
rules on free movement of persons which allow significant migration to the UK from other EEA 
states47. This was the very issue that influenced many UK voters to favour Brexit and we have seen 
above that the Prime Minister has, at the same time as reiterating a commitment to free trade, 
stated that the UK intends to take control over immigration. EEA membership would also entail 
significant UK contributions to the EU budget48, which was another voter concern – although budget 
contributions, at least on temporary basis to ensure stability, might well anyway be envisaged as a 
requirement of even a more limited trade deal and have not been ruled out by the UK.  The very fact 
that EEA membership, or similar, is effectively “EU-lite” raises questions over whether this option 
would be in line with the spirit of the referendum outcome. From the perspective of the UK’s trading 
partners, support now also seems to be strong for a “hard” Brexit to deter further departures from 
the EU. Such departures could potentially call into question the EU’s very pre-eminence at the heart 
of Europe as an organisation which most European countries either belong to or aspire to join; and 
in this light loss of economic benefits from UK participation in the single market may well be 
considered to be significantly outweighed by the longer term political and economic costs of 
allowing the UK to participate from outside the EU. EEA membership now looks very much less likely 
that it did in the immediate aftermath of the referendum. 
3. Another type of trade agreement with the EU –  the “bespoke option” (e.g. “Switzerland 
option”): business as usual or limited change? 
Given this situation, a different possibility that may well come to pass is that the UK will negotiate a 
different, bespoke, trade arrangement with the EU. Given the EU’s approach to its trade agreements 
in general it seems very likely that that any such arrangement would include procurement 
provisions, and it is possible, although not inevitable, that these would be the same as under EU/EEA 
rules.  
The EU has many bespoke agreements that go beyond its general commitments under World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules – for example, providing for lower tariffs for imports than it applies under 
the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It is striking that these agreements now 
invariably address public procurement49. The EU considers its own procurement markets to be open 
de facto, and it is committed to formally opening these markets when partners are willing to 
                                                          
46 There are formal differences including the absence of any power to impose fines for violations by Governments (which 
the CJEU possesses) and the fact that when states seek references from the EFTA Court on questions of interpretation the 
responses have only the status of an advisory opinion rather than being legally binding on national review bodies, but 
these are not the only considerations. 
47 EEA Agreement Art.28, paralleling TFEU Art.45. Also applicable and relevant to migration is Directive 2004/38/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing 
Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC (Text with EEA relevance) (the Citizenship Directive) [2004] OJ L158/77. 
48 Both to the funds for reduction of regional and social disparities and to specific programmes, such as those for research 
development. The former will be politically more problematic than the latter.  Contributions to the administration of any 
new institutional arrangements would also be required.  
49 For a full list of agreements with public procurement provisions and those currently being negotiated see the 
information provided by the European Commission at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/public-
procurement/ 
reciprocate50, in line with the liberal external trade policy envisaged in Art.206 TFEU51. It has also 
generally been insistent on procurement being addressed in any trade agreements. Not surprisingly, 
provisions aimed ultimately at complete liberalisation of procurement under rules in line with the EU 
acquis are an element of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements with actual or potential EU 
candidates (such as some of the Balkan states)52. However, significant provisions for liberalising 
public procurement which, where possible, are supported by rules on transparent award procedures 
and supplier remedies, are also included even in agreements that do not seek to pave the way for EU 
accession. In recent years these have generally been modelled on those of the GPA 2012.  
Thus public procurement provisions are included in various bilateral agreements with states covered 
by the European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP) framework in North Africa, the Middle East and 
the former Soviet Union53. In particular, Association Agreements concluded in 2014 with the 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia54 have provided for gradual reciprocal liberalisation of procurement, 
based on transparent tendering and gradual alignment of procurement legislation with the EU rules, 
as part of a wider package of alignment measures; and these Agreements have given the impetus to 
the former two countries to accede quickly to the GPA55.  Other agreements with neighbour 
countries have included less extensive and concrete provisions but nevertheless given particular 
significance to public procurement. Typical is the partnership and cooperation Agreement with 
Armenia, providing for Armenia to “endeavour” to approximate its laws with those of the EU56 and 
for the parties to “cooperate to develop conditions for open and competitive award of contracts for 
goods and services in particular through calls for tenders”57; and again this gave impetus to recent 
GPA accession58.  
Outside the immediate neighbourhood, trade agreements with Mexico (2000), Chile (2002), 
Columbia and Peru (2013) and Ecuador (initialled in 2014) also contain extensive provisions for 
mutual access to procurement markets. In this regard an early Agreement was that with Mexico59 
                                                          
50 This position and the desire for reciprocity given the open nature of EU markets are highlighted by European 
Commission, Amended proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the access of third-
country goods and services to the Union’s internal market in public procurement and procedures supporting negotiations 
on access of Union goods and services to the public procurement markets of third countries COM/2016/034 final - 
2012/060 (COD), proposing an instrument that will provide for possible closure of EU markets where there is no reciprocity 
from trading partners. 
51 And in accordance with the strategy that was clearly adopted in the 1980s in parallel with the push to complete the 
internal market by 1992, as set out in Commission Memorandum of 1988, "Europe 1992: Europe World Partner", 
Commission Press Release P 117 of October 19, 1988. 
52 See [2004] O.J. L 084/13 (FYROM), [2009] O.J. L 107/166 (Albania), [2010] O.J. L108/1 (Montenegro), [2013] O.J. L 278/1 
(Serbia). Turkey, which has a Customs Union with the EU, has also commenced the process of adapting its procurement 
legislation to that of the EU in the context of accession negotiations, but negotiations on liberalisation of procurement as 
part of the potential development of the Customs Union were suspended in 2002: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/turkey/ 
53 The ENP framework covers Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. 
54 [2014] O.J. L260/1 (Moldova); [2014] O.J. L261/1 (Georgia); [2014] O.J. L161/1 (Ukraine). 
55 The 2012 GPA came into force for the Ukraine on 18 May 2016 and Moldova on 14 July 2016.  
56 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, 
and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part [1999] O.J. L 239/3. Art.43(1) and (2). Armenia has declined to sign an 
Association Agreement but negotiations were launched in December 2015 for a new agreement to replace that of 1999: 
see the information provided by the European Commission at 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/eu_armenia/political_relations/index_en.htm 
57 Art.48. 
58 In force since 6 June 2015. 
59 Decision 2/2000 of the EC/Mexico Joint Council of March 23, 2000, [2000] O.J. L157 and [2002] O.J. L245, adopted under 
the Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its 
Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican states, of the other part [2000] O.J. L276/45 (Art.10 of which 
provides the framework principles for liberalising procurement). Public procurement is dealt with in Decision 2/2000 in 
Title III (Arts 25-38) and Annexes VI-XI. See H. Hoffmann-Jenssen and O. Stehmann, "The EU-Mexico Free Trade 
Agreement" [2001] 10 P.P.L.R. NA1; J. Schnitzer (2005) "The External Sphere of Public Procurement Law: Bi-regional Trade 
providing for mutual opening of central government procurement based on national treatment. 
From the Mexican side this is supported by an undertaking to apply award procedures to which 
Mexico is already committed under the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), whilst the EU 
undertakes to provide access in accordance with GPA procedures, whilst supplier review measures 
also apply60; these procedures are deemed “equivalent”61 and also apply in future variations 
provided that equivalence still exists62.  In the case of Chile the Agreement63 again provides for 
mutual opening of procurement based on national treatment, in this case at both central and 
regional/local level, and for award procedures modelled on those of the GPA64 and for supplier 
review65. The same general approach using a GPA model is followed for the Andean Community 
under the Trade Agreement concluded with Columbia and Peru66 (now applied provisionally), and in 
July 2014 negotiations were concluded for Ecuador to accede to the same Agreement67. An 
agreement concluded with Iraq in 2012 (the trade elements of which are in force provisionally) 
similarly provides for mutual opening of certain markets68 with GPA-based procedures and supplier 
review, as does an Association Agreement concluded with the Central American countries of 
Panama, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras69, the trade elements of which 
have been provisionally applied since 2013. An agreement recently negotiated with Vietnam is 
similar, although with temporary derogations from some of the GPA-type procedural requirements 
for Vietnam70 (and an interesting feature of this Agreement in the light of Brexit is the requirement 
for the Parties to provide summaries of their notices in English71 and for the EU to provide financial 
and technical assistance to Vietnam to this end72). The EU is also negotiating a free trade agreement 
with Mercosur, in which public procurement (a subject covered within Mercosur itself) is an 
important item on the agenda73. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Relations from the Perspective of the European Community" (2005) 14 P.P.L.R. 63, pp.79-81. Negotiations for updating the 
Agreement commenced in June 2016: see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/mexico/ 
60 Decision 2/2000, Art. 30. 
61 Decision 2/2000, Art. 29(1). 
62 Decision 2/2000, Art. 29(2). 
63 Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and 
the Republic of Chile, of the other part [2002] O.J. L352/3. 
64 See Arts 143-154. 
65 Art.155. 
66 Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Columbia and Peru, of the 
other part, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=691. Procurement is dealt with in Title VI, 
applicable award procedures being set out in Arts 175-189 and challenge procedures provided for in Art.190.  Detailed 
provisions on public procurement including coverage, advertising media, time periods and tender documentation are 
contained in Annex XII to the Agreement: see http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/regions/andean-
community/ 
67 The text is published at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1156, and will be applied following 
completion of the relevant internal procedures. 
68 Partnership and cooperation agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the 
Republic of Iraq, of the other part [2012] OJ L204/20. 
69 EU-Central America Association Agreement, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=689, Arts 209-227, 
and Annex XVI setting out coverage. The Agreements often provide for limitations even for covered procurement - for 
example, the possibility for Iraq to provide price preferences for a temporary period of 10 years, and provision for the 
Central American partners to maintain policies in favour of ethnic minorities and micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises and to maintain existing measures requiring local establishment or registration (to be reviewed after ten years. 
70 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement; available (in a text as at Jan 2016 published for information purposes only which is 
subject to legal revision) at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154216.pdf. Government 
procurement is dealt with in Ch.9 and related Annexes. The procedural derogations are in Annex 9-a, “Transitional 
Measures for the implementation of this Chapter by Vietnam”. 
71 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement Ch.9 Art.VI.3. 
72 EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement Ch.9 Art.VI.4. 
73 See, most recently, European Commission, Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with Mercosur 
Potential gains for the EU (May 2016) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/may/tradoc_154559.pdf 
For many of the EU’s major trading partners, including the US, Japan and Canada, mutual access to 
procurement has been developed mainly under the framework of the GPA itself74, as explained 
further below. However, the EU also has additional bespoke agreements with some of its 
longstanding GPA partners, providing for access to procurement beyond that generally provided 
under the GPA framework and/or to some extent for other specificities in award procedures and 
enforcement.  
The most extensive agreement is that with Switzerland. The EU concluded a free trade agreement 
with Switzerland in 1972 and alongside this the Parties later concluded two packages of bilateral 
agreements (one in 1999 following Switzerland’s decision not to join the EEA, and another in 2004) 
under which, in return for access to the single market, Switzerland undertook to apply many EU laws 
and to further consider their adoption on a case-by-case basis. They include a specific agreement on 
public procurement, which came into force on 1 June 200275.  This does not provide for complete 
application of the EU procurement rules and to a large extent is in fact based on GPA award 
procedures and remedies (which in this case is the GPA 199476 since the GPA 2012 has not yet been 
ratified by Switzerland77). However, the scope of liberalisation goes further than is provided for 
generally by the GPA framework: the latter does not extend at all to certain utility sectors covered 
by the Directives and also, unlike the EU’s Utilities Directives, does not cover private utilities that 
enjoy special or exclusive rights, but the Agreement with Switzerland provides for some coverage of 
these areas, in line with the approach of the EU’s internal market78. For this procurement to which 
the GPA will not necessarily apply (private utilities etc), the Agreement provides not for use of an 
established model of procedures but for covered contracts to be awarded simply in accordance with 
principles of "non-discrimination, transparency and fairness"79, and for some explicit, although 
skeletal, obligations on advertising, time limits, award criteria and selection criteria/qualification 
systems80 and specifications81. This choice of a limited approach rather than adoption of GPA 
procedures is no doubt influenced by what is palatable for the relevant utilities. In relation to 
enforcement, the Agreement provides for supplier review procedures before an independent 
body82, as well as monitoring by each party through an independent authority which is able to deal 
with complaints and to take administrative or judicial enforcement action83.  These procurement 
provisions do, however, need to be seen in the context of the broader package of measures 
providing for a single market between the EU and Switzerland, including provision for general 
                                                          
74 Which now, given impetus by the trade agreements on procurement with the EU, also covers the Ukraine, Moldova and 
Armenia, as noted above. 
75 Agreement between the European Community and Swiss Confederation on certain aspects of government procurement 
[2002] O.J. L114/430. 
76 With commitments between the EU and Switzerland under the 1994 GPA having been expanded by the 1999 Agreement 
between the European Community and Swiss Confederation on certain aspects of government procurement referred to 
above. 
77 This is still pending in light of the process of bringing sub-federal legislation in Switzerland into compliance with the new 
GPA. On the GPA 1994 and 2012 see further below. 
78 Art.3(5) provides for the non-application of the 1999 Agreement's obligations to utilities where other entities are "free to 
offer the same services in the same geographical area and under substantially the same conditions" - that is to utilities in 
competitive markets. This allows for excluding from the Agreement EU utilities that are exempt from the EU Utilities 
Directive under the exemption for entities in competitive markets (now in the internal regime under Arts 34-35 of the 2014 
Utilities Directive). 
79 Art.4(1) of the Agreement between the European Community and Swiss Confederation on certain aspects of government 
procurement. 
80 Art.4(1) of the Agreement between the European Community and Swiss Confederation on certain aspects of government 
procurement. 
81 Art.4(2) of the Agreement between the European Community and Swiss Confederation on certain aspects of government 
procurement. 
82 Art.5 and Annex V of the Agreement between the European Community and Swiss Confederation on certain aspects of 
government procurement . 
83 Art.8 of the Agreement between the European Community and Swiss Confederation on certain aspects of government 
procurement. 
evolution of relevant Swiss laws towards those of the EU. More broadly, leaving aside the specific 
case of public procurement, this general approach adopted towards achieving a single market has 
not overall been a conspicuous success and does not seem likely to be replicated in a general way 
with the UK84.   
Current initiatives for broader and deeper trade agreements with Canada and the United States – 
both also GPA Parties – also put considerable emphasis on public procurement, and include 
negotiations on issues going beyond the GPA. The negotiations with the US for a Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) not only seek, between the EU and US, expanded coverage in 
relation to the types of procurement already regulated between some Parties within the GPA 
framework, but also seek to go beyond that framework in developing more detailed common rules 
on some aspects of award procedures – which from the EU perspective seem to aim at introducing 
EU-type regulation for some matters - and also enforcement measures going beyond those of the 
GPA85. In the case of Canada negotiations were concluded in 2014 for a Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA)86 which, after various delays and controversies87, was finally adopted 
by the Council and signed on 30 October 201688. CETA89 extends the scope of open procurement 
markets between the Parties90, including for some sub-federal procurement that Canada does not 
open to other GPA Parties (such as communes and their utilities, and universities). Contracts are to 
be awarded in accordance with specified procedures modelled on those of the GPA91, and there us 
provision again for supplier review (although more limited than under the GPA)92 and also for a joint 
Committee on Government Procurement for monitoring and consultation purposes93. Negotiations 
were also concluded in 2014 for a general comprehensive trade agreement with Singapore94, 
another GPA Party, which again provides (in Art.10) for opening up specified procurement based on 
procedures and remedies which largely mirror those of the GPA and again with a joint body for 
monitoring and consultation (the  Committee on Trade in Services, Investment and Government 
Procurement). Coverage will include, for example, works and services concessions95, an area whose 
current coverage under the GPA more generally within the general definition of procurement is 
rather uncertain96, as well as expanded coverage of utilities. A 2011 Free Trade Agreement with 
South Korea, another GPA Party97, sets up a Government Procurement Working Group with a view 
to enhancing future liberalisation between the EU and South Korea98.  
Whilst each agreement has its own political context and special features, the importance they all 
place on public procurement means that if and when a separate trade agreement is concluded 
between the EU and UK it is hard to envisage an agreement acceptable to the EU that would not 
include extensive procurement provisions. The exact form that these might take, however, is harder 
                                                          
84 P. Wang, “Brexit and the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)” (2017) 26 P.P.L.R. xx 
85 See Position paper by the European Commission, p.10, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-
DCL-1/en/pdf;  R. Craven, “EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement: the European Commission's 
negotiating position on public procurement” (2014) 23 P.P.L.R. NA65. 
86 The text is available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf.  
87 Including because of debate over whether or not it was a mixed agreement and last minute issues over acceptance by 
Belgium.  
88 Its trade provisions will come into force provisionally once it is approved by the European Parliament. 
89 Procurement is dealt with in CETA Art.19. 
90 CETA Art.19.2 and associated Market Access Schedules. 
91 CETA Art.19.5-19.16. 
92 CETA Art.19.17. 
93 CETA Art.19.9. 
94 For the draft text see http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961. 
95 See Annex 10-F and Annex 10-I. 
96 See R. D. Anderson and S. Arrowsmith, “The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Past Present and Future”, ch.1 
in S. Arrowsmith and R. D. Anderson (eds), The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform (CUP, 
2011), pp.48-52. 
97 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Korea [2011] O.J. L127/6.  
98 Free Trade Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Korea Art.9.3. 
to predict, particularly in light of the uncertain and highly charged political environment in which 
negotiations will take place.  
Given that in the recent agreements the provisions on procedures and review that support market 
access commitments have been modelled to the greatest extent possible, even in agreements with 
non-GPA Parties, on those of the GPA, the minimum commitment that can probably be expected in 
any EU-UK agreement is to open up public procurement under the framework of the GPA itself, with 
general coverage of the type of procurement covered by the EU’s own GPA commitments. This could 
be provided for simply under the GPA itself without needing to conclude any broader trade 
agreement, and this seems in fact a distinct possibility, either as a first step (being possibly easier to 
negotiate in isolation from wider trade issues) or as the long-term solution. The implications of 
adopting this minimal “GPA option” are examined further in the next section below. 
However, it seems a strong possibility, also, that either a broad EU-UK trade agreement, or (although 
perhaps less likely) an agreement concerned specifically with public procurement that is negotiated 
outside a broader package, might go beyond this minimum, adhering more closely to the coverage 
and rules of the EU’s regime.  
Such an agreement might involve, first, broader coverage of the rules than applies to the EU under 
the GPA, to embrace procurement that is outside the GPA but subject to the EU’s internal rules. As 
Wang explains further in this same issue of the Review99, the EU’s internal regime is broader than 
that of the GPA in several respects. First, the EU regime covers in principle certain additional utility 
sectors, namely gas and heat, postal services and the extraction of oil and gas and exploration for, or 
extraction of, coal or other solid fuels. Secondly, the EU regime but not the GPA covers certain 
utilities purely on the basis that they have special or exclusive rights in relation to the utility activity 
in question, even though the entities are not “public” in any other sense. This more extensive 
coverage of utilities is reflected, as we have seen, in the agreement with Switzerland, although it is 
true that this is a special situation given the broader package of measures relating to Switzerland. 
Thirdly, the EU’s internal regime covers works and services concessions, the general status of which 
is somewhat unclear under GPA rules, including the basic definition of procurement100. The EU has, 
however, recently sought to include concessions within its trade agreements as seen, for example, in 
its recent agreements with both South Korea and Singapore, no doubt influenced by the deeper 
regulation of concessions in the internal EU’s regime under Concessions Directive 2014/23101. 
Fourthly, under the TFEU obligations of national treatment and transparency cover all contracts of 
cross-border interest, as assessed on a case-by-case basis, even those below the Directives’ 
thresholds102; this approach has no parallel in the GPA, which applies only to contracts above the 
thresholds specified for each Party (which for the EU are coordinated with those of the directives). 
Fifthly, the GPA’s coverage of hard defence procurement is more limited. Coverage that is based on 
the EU rules, rather than the GPA, as a starting point could potentially cover all these matters which 
are, of course, regulated in the UK at present in accordance with its obligations as an EU Member 
States. 
Secondly, an EU-UK agreement might also include award procedures and/or rules on supplier review 
that go beyond those of the GPA. So far as award procedures are concerned, the EU and GPA 
regimes are similar in their essentials. They have developed in parallel and influenced each other 
over many years, and to the extent that the EU’s internal regime has not provided for the minimum 
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100 See again R. D. Anderson and S. Arrowsmith, “The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Past Present and Future”, 
ch.1 in S. Arrowsmith and R. D. Anderson (eds), The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform 
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101 Concessions Directive n.xx above. See  R. Craven, “The EU’s 2014 Concessions Directive” (2014) 23 P.P.L.R. 188. 
102 Case C-324/98 Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom Austria and Herold Business Data AG 
[2000] ECR I-10745; C-412/04, Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-00619.  
requirements of the GPA, the internal regime has been adapted to do so even though, technically, it 
was necessary to make such adaptations only for the benefit of suppliers from non-EU GPA Parties, 
and not to the internal regime itself103. However, whilst mirroring the GPA minimum requirements, 
the EU directives also include many more strictures than the GPA on important matters. For 
example, for entities and contracts covered by the 2014 Public Contracts Directive, the possibility of 
using procedures involving negotiation is more limited104 than under the GPA (where this is generally 
allowed where signalled in advance105), as is use of mandatory qualification systems106; whilst under 
both the 2014 Public Contracts Directive and 2014 Utilities Directive electronic procurement is 
mandatory107 (although with a transition period in many cases). The EU Directives also include 
complex and uncertain provisions on an array of detailed matters not addressed at all, or not 
addressed in a detailed manner, in the GPA, which entail additional obligations and restrictions; to 
take just a few examples, they include limits on use of award criteria relating to experience of 
staff108, rules on life-cycle costing109, obligations relating to sub-contracting110, and detailed rules on 
evidence of proof of financial and technical ability111, including a general requirement to accept self-
declarations on many matters prior to the actual contract award112. The EU remedies regime113 is 
also more stringent in many respects: in particular, the GPA has no requirement for a standstill 
between notification of award and conclusion of the contract such as exists under the EU regime, 
nor a requirement for automatic suspension of awards; nor is there any requirement of 
ineffectiveness such as applies in the EU for unlawful direct awards or certain breaches of standstill 
and suspension rules114. The EU public sector regime also differs in requiring the possibility of set 
aside of unlawful decisions as a general rule115 rather than allowing damages as an alternative116, 
and in requiring any damages remedy to include lost profits117. The EU also, of course, has a 
significant centralised mechanism for monitoring, enforcement and interpretation through the 
European Commission and CJEU118 as well as provision in the 2014 directives for a more extensive 
                                                          
103 On this and the adaptations see the historical account of the EU procurement regime in  S.Arrowsmith, The Law of 
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national monitoring and enforcement function119 - and we have already suggested above that any 
less effective EU/UK arrangement might result in leaving unaddressed issues of compliance (notably 
in the area of UK supplier remedies) that might otherwise have been taken up by the EU. 
Several factors may give impetus to conclusion of an arrangement between the EU and UK in 
procurement that is broader and/or deeper than the GPA in some or all of the above respects, and 
make it a distinct possibility. One factor, as we have seen, is that in all the areas referred to above – 
coverage, award procedures and enforcement – the EU has included, or sought to include, broader 
or deeper rules based on the Directives in other trade agreements, even with countries that are not 
potential candidates for accession, in the limited cases in which this has been feasible. Secondly, 
given that the UK has both agreed and applied the EU rules in full already, and has had input into 
their content, acceptance of these rules in a new trade agreement, as regards both open markets 
and the supporting award procedures and remedies, is very much easier for the UK than for other 
countries. This is the case politically in terms of the substance of commitments (including regulation 
of private sector entities), and from the perspective of the technical adaptations and resources 
needed for compliance – a not inconsiderable consideration in this complex area.  Whilst lack of 
familiarity and input makes it unreasonable to impose the EU Directives’ detailed procedures and 
remedies on other trading partners, leading the EU to accept broadly comparable or even more 
limited rules, these arguments do not have force for the UK. Thirdly, any national treatment 
commitment that would presumably be included in any agreement would entail the EU Member 
States applying the award procedures and supplier review provisions of the EU regime (which apply 
to national suppliers as well as to those from other Member States120) for the benefit of UK 
suppliers, and the EU may be reluctant to do this without full reciprocity; application of the less 
stringent GPA procedures and remedies might be considered unacceptable in light of the ease with 
which the UK could apply them, even if adequate for other trading partners.  
However, even in an agreement not confined solely to the GPA framework it is clearly possible that 
the full EU regime might not be applied. As regards coverage, one might well envisage exclusion of 
hard defence procurement from a general regime, even if arrangements for mutual access to 
markets might be envisaged in the context of continuing defence cooperation through, in particular, 
the European Defence Agency (which has arrangements with, for example, Switzerland and 
Norway)121. Other sensitive areas, such as health services, public-public arrangements or voluntary 
organisations might become issues of negotiation. As in many other trade agreements it might also 
be considered inappropriate to regulate procurement below the Directives’ thresholds and/or the 
UK may resist this as disproportionate or undesirable – for example, because of political pressure to 
use procurement to promote local Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) or because the EU’s 
rules are regarded as too bureaucratic and uncertain, and of limited value122. It is also conceivable 
that the UK might want to negotiate for more limited award procedures and supplier review in 
certain respects – perhaps even for a regime based on the GPA, as with other EU trading partners, 
but combined with broader coverage than the GPA in the utilities sectors, as with the Swiss model. 
However, adding any bespoke elements to an agreement would introduce difficulties and delay.  
It is impossible to predict what might happen in these respects in light of the many factors that could 
affect the position, including the parties’ political stance in the overall negotiations and the domestic 
political concerns at the time of negotiations that might influence the approach to carve-outs. Given 
this situation the precise impact of any trade agreement on the three aspects of procurement policy 
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– industrial policy, social and environmental policy, and award procedures and remedies – is also 
impossible to assess. However, what is clear is that any bespoke procurement agreement will 
continue to preclude industrial policy measures through procurement to a very large extent, 
although some limited scope could appear for this in areas such as hard defence and low-value 
procurement which might be taken out of the open market and on which there are also no 
commitments to other countries. A regime based otherwise on current EU rules would, however, 
leave untouched the scope for domestic flexibility on award procedures and supplier review.  
To the extent that EU definitions and rules (for example, on aggregation) continue to be used for 
defining coverage – which, as we suggest below, is to be expected even under a GPA-based solution 
and therefore a fortiori under a bespoke agreement – and to the extent that EU rules and remedies 
continue to apply, one issue will be how the rules are to be interpreted as they evolve within the EU 
through new legislation and jurisprudence. Of course, this is not just an issue for public 
procurement, and will need to be addressed in any wider trade package. No doubt some kind of 
joint committee of the Parties would be established as with the EU’s other trade agreements. 
However, any automatic reception of new rules would be controversial and perhaps unlikely, 
especially in the light of the Prime Minister’s recent statement that the UK will not submit to the 
CJEU. This is one factor that may be an obstacle to concluding a wide and deep trade agreement 
with the EU more generally, and may give impetus towards a solely or largely GPA-based solution for 
public procurement.  
The exact extent of the UK’s own access to EU procurement markets will, of course, depend on the 
UK’s own coverage, as any agreement will certainly be based on reciprocity; thus any limitations in 
relation to, for example, defence or low value procurement, will be mirrored in a corresponding loss 
of access to the relevant EU markets.  
How likely is such a bespoke agreement that goes beyond the GPA framework at least in some 
respects? If a general trade agreement can be concluded then it is almost certain that public 
procurement will be included: this is very likely to be the preference of the UK in order to retain 
access to EU procurement markets (as discussed further below) but it is anyway unlikely to be 
possible to exclude procurement in light of the EU’s policy of including procurement in its trade 
agreements.  Assuming procurement provisions are included, it is very possible that they will be 
influenced by the scope, rules and remedies of the current EU regime, perhaps to a significant 
degree, and go beyond the GPA framework. However, the political and practical difficulties of 
concluding any broad and deep trade agreement with the EU in the immediate aftermath of Brexit 
means that trade relations both in public procurement and more generally may well be based, at 
least initially, solely on the WTO framework – the so-called “brutal Brexit”.   
4. The “GPA option”: limited change - but for the better?  
4.1. The practicalities and possibilities of GPA accession 
This “brutal Brexit” scenario under which UK departs from the EU without a specific trade agreement 
with the EU means that the relationship will be governed only by WTO trading rules. To a large 
extent, in particular as regards the tariffs imposed on goods under GATT (which range from 0-45%), 
this means that the EU must apply to the UK the same rules that it applies to other WTO members, 
by virtue of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) requirements (and vice versa).   As explained, by Ping 
Wang in his article elsewhere in this issue of the Review123, the UK is already a member of the WTO 
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in its own right, although new schedules of commitments may be needed in many areas since the 
UK’s current commitments apply only by virtue of its EU membership124.  
However, the positon of government procurement is a little different. This is governed mainly by the 
GPA125 but, unlike the other key WTO Agreements, the GPA is a plurilateral agreement – that is, it is 
optional and depends on specific accession. This provides the main basis for the relationship in 
public procurement between current EU members – including the UK – and many of the EU’s main 
trading partners, as well as for the relationship of other GPA countries inter se.  As Ping Wang’s 
article also explains, however, the UK is not a Party to the GPA other than through its EU 
membership. His view and that of most others126 is that the UK will after Brexit therefore need to 
apply to accede to the GPA in the same way as any other country seeking to become a Party, 
although a different view put forward by Bartels is that the UK will remain Party to the GPA 
automatically in its own right in accordance with rules of customary international law on accession 
to treaties and past practice under GATT 1947127. It can be noted that MFN rules are generally 
considered inapplicable in relation to GPA coverage (MFN treatment is not required to be extended 
even to the Parties to the GPA itself, let alone between all WTO members)128. Thus the UK will not 
enjoy access to any significant procurement markets under WTO rules unless it is a Party to the GPA.  
Assuming that a GPA accession application will be needed for this, then regardless of whether there 
is a specific EU-UK trade agreement it seems quite likely that the UK will wish to make an 
application, in order both to retain its current access to GPA Parties’ procurement markets and to 
gain access to the procurement markets of the increasing number of countries that have applied to 
join (notably China) or are interested in this. As Ping Wang points out129, GPA accession will also 
facilitate continuing UK access to third country markets that it currently enjoys as an EU Member 
State, since the agreements providing this access are, as we have seen, based largely on GPA 
templates. Further, if there is no bespoke UK-EU agreement, the incentive for the UK to join the GPA 
will be even greater, since the GPA will then provide a basis for UK access to the EU’s own 
procurement markets. The importance of this is enhanced by the fact that whilst EU markets are 
largely open de facto at present even to countries without legal rights to access, the position may 
change if the EU eventually adopts its proposed trade instrument on restricting access to EU markets 
for third countries that do not provide reciprocal access130.  Further, the UK has been a key voice 
within the EU arguing for liberalisation, including in opposing this trade instrument, recognising that 
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final. However, opposing an instrument that may require the UK to exclude certain third countries from its markets is not 
the same as choosing simply to have freedom of action to do in its own discretion. 
even unilateral liberalisation is often economically beneficial. Of course, by reason of this fact Brexit 
itself could improve the prospects of the trade instrument being adopted, and of the UK being shut 
out of EU procurement markets unless it concludes some specific reciprocal arrangement. As Ping 
Wang also points out, GPA accession is also more attractive for the UK than for many other 
countries, since negotiation and compliance costs will be limited given that the Agreement already 
applies in the UK131. 
On the other hand, the value of access to EU procurement markets under the GPA will be less than 
the value of current access since it will be affected by general trade barriers (such as tariffs on goods 
imported for public contracts) which will be greater after Brexit. It also cannot be totally ruled out 
that the Government might decide against GPA accession anyway, including as a result of political 
pressure to use public procurement as an industrial policy tool, if this were is not already 
constrained by a separate EU agreement. However, this does seem unlikely. 
Accession will, of course, depend not merely on the UK’s preference in light of these considerations, 
but on acceptance by GPA Parties, and in this regard the key question is whether the EU will assist or 
hinder the UK’s application. This is again impossible to predict. It is possible that in the context of a 
“brutal Brexit” the EU might be unwilling to go beyond the minimum required by its strict WTO 
obligations and therefore be unwilling to conclude any agreement on procurement, including 
through the GPA. However, given the EU’s push for GPA accession for all WTO members, including 
by requiring a commitment on this as a condition of WTO membership for new members (as 
happened, for example, with China), it may be politically awkward to take a different approach to 
the UK, and the fact that procurement negotiations between the EU and UK can be addressed within 
the WTO forum separately from other matters should facilitate agreement on this subject. Further, 
as Ping Wang points out, UK accession to the GPA could help ensure that the EU itself is not subject 
to successful compensation claims by other GPA Parties as a result of the lower value of EU markets 
under the GPA following Brexit132.  
4.2. Coverage issues 
If the UK does decide to accede to the GPA and this is accepted by the Parties, what markets the UK 
will open up will depend on bilateral negotiations with the different Parties. (Unlike under the EU 
rules, there is not a pre-determined and identical scope of coverage for all countries and also, as 
noted above, a Party is not required to give the same commitments to all trading partners.) 
Coverage for each Party is set out in Annexes referring to different aspects of coverage (Annex I for 
each Party listing covered central government entities, Annex 2 dealing with most sub-federal and 
local coverage etc).  
In principle the EU (including the UK at present) opens up most procurement covered by the 
Directives, but with some significant limitations which, as mentioned, relate mainly to private 
utilities, certain utility sectors, concessions, and defence procurement; and the GPA, unlike the EU’s 
internal regime, is also not applicable to contracts below the Directives’ thresholds. Further, to the 
extent feasible EU coverage is set out using the concepts and definitions in the Directives, to secure 
a harmonised approach between the GPA and the internal regime. Thus, for example, Annex 2 uses 
the concept of “body governing by public law”, that is used in the Directives133, to define coverage of 
Annex 2 entities that are not “regional” or “local” contracting authorities, whilst Annex III relating to 
utilities uses the concept of a “public undertaking” that is used in the Utilities Directive134 and also 
uses that Directive’s definitions to delimit covered utility activities. The EU does not provide access 
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to all this procurement, however, to all Parties: where others do not reciprocate in a particular area 
(for example, a specific utility sector), the EU limits access to its own equivalent procurement135.  
If the UK does decide to apply to join the GPA it might well be expected that the UK’s coverage offer 
will reflect its current coverage and, even apart from this, will continue to use “EU” terminology and 
definitions. This will certainly speed up accessions negotiations. It is significant in this regard that the 
UK Governments have recently used “EU” concepts to define the scope of certain purely domestic 
procurement rules and powers. Thus the entities potentially subject to regulation under s.39(1) of 
the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, which gives to the Minister for the Cabinet 
Office or the Secretary of State a general power to make regulations on public procurement, are 
defined by reference to the concept of “contracting authority” under the EU’s 2014 Public Contracts 
Directive136. The Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012, requiring consideration of 
environmental/social considerations in relation to certain services contracts, again uses the concept 
of contracting authority to define entity coverage137 as well as referring to the EU concept of a public 
service contract138 to define the types of contracts covered139. The Equality Act 2010 also refers to 
both the concept of contracting authority140 and the functions regulated by the 2014 Public 
Contracts Directive141 in delimiting the Ministerial power under that Act to make regulations on how 
the Public Sector Equality Duty142 will apply. The Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 also uses 
the “EU” concepts of contracting authority and public contracts to define the coverage of the Act143, 
which, inter alia, imposes a general duty of sustainable procurement and regulates procedures for 
both contracts above and (in certain cases) below the EU thresholds. In view of their familiarity both 
within the UK itself and to its trading partners, it seems very possible that the UK will choose to use 
these concepts of EU origin in future arrangements unless there is a good reason for a different 
approach. So far as substance, rather than merely terminology is concerned, there may be some 
desire by the UK to depart from EU GPA-coverage in some sensitive areas, as mentioned earlier in 
considering the possibility of a bespoke agreement with the EU. However, given that doing so may 
delay and complicate accession and that most of the sensitive areas mentioned earlier are either not 
covered by the GPA (low-value procurement) or their coverage is uncertain (public-public 
arrangements144), this is perhaps unlikely. 
It is also worth reiterating that the EU’s negotiations with other GPA countries to extend opening of 
procurement, including with the United States under TTIP and Canada under CETA, to some extent 
aim at extending the scope of covered procurement markets within a GPA framework. Were the UK 
to leave the EU, the UK could conclude a separate agreement – or no agreement – with the US and 
Canada, potentially adding complications to the UK’s GPA negotiations, although it might also 
merely conclude agreements on the coverage terms already negotiated. 
 
4.3. The implications of a GPA solution: industrial development policies 
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What would be the implications, then, of the UK’s trade relationships in public procurement being 
based solely on the GPA? 
Regarding the first aspect of our enquiry, industrial development policies, we have already noted 
that for covered procurement there would be little change in the ability of the UK to use 
procurement as a policy tool – for example, to protect declining industries, promote new ones, 
support local or national employment, promote national SMEs or assist less-developed regions; it is 
requirements not to favour national industry from which most constraints derive in this regard and 
these will apply under the GPA for covered procurement145. In contrast with the position under the 
EU rules there is in theory scope to negotiate exceptions even for covered procurement – for 
example, for specific policies - since everything related to coverage depends on negotiation. 
However, politically there is no realistic prospect of this for new accessions from developed 
countries; this is signalled formally by inclusion in the revised GPA 2012 Art.V of specific provisions 
contemplating special arrangements for developing countries (and then only on a temporary 
basis)146 and by the commitment in future work programmes to eliminate existing discriminatory 
measures147. There are general derogations that may be invoked under GPA 2012 Art.III.1, 
concerning security and defence, and Art.III.2, allowing measures necessary to protect public morals, 
order or safety, human, animal or plant life or health and intellectual property, and relating to goods 
or services of persons with disabilities, philanthropic institutions or prison labour. However, while 
their scope remains largely untested, they seem to have little application to industrial policy. Where 
an impact may be seen, however, is in relation to procurement that is no longer covered by any 
international rules, in particular low-value procurement and hard defence procurement. How the UK 
might react to greater flexibility in these areas is considered briefly later below.   
4.4. The implications of a GPA solution: social and environmental policies 
So far as concerns use of procurement to promote social and environmental policies, some 
measures are clearly constrained by the GPA’s national treatment rules, as they are by the EU 
rules148. As regards the constraints of procedural rules on these policies, on the other hand, the 
position is rather uncertain. In particular, whilst the procedural rules of the Directives have been 
subject to extensive judicial interpretation and legislative clarification that has largely limited 
measures to those connected with the contract’s subject matter, those of the GPA have not yet been 
considered from this perspective and it is unclear whether they involve the same restrictions. Thus, 
in particular, it remains unclear under the GPA whether award criteria based on the “most 
advantageous tender” basis149 are limited in this way, ruling out, for example, price preferences for 
SMEs or minority owned businesses; whether contract conditions are also so limited, precluding 
conditions that do not concern the works, supplies or services or the way they are delivered – for 
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example, prohibiting government suppliers from investing in unethical industries150; or whether 
suppliers can be excluded based on general social or environmental considerations, such as their 
willingness to follow “fair” recruitment or fair trade policies in their business as a whole151. These 
uncertainties cannot be discussed in detail here but have been examined by the author 
elsewhere152.   It is on the resolution of these uncertainties that the extent of flexibility under the 
GPA mainly turns. There are also some other respects in which GPA-only award procedures may 
offer a bit more flexibility in using procurement in support of social or environmental policies – for 
example, in allowing rejection in advance of tenderers that are unable to comply with social and 
environmental requirements relating to contract performance, which is not always permitted under 
EU law153; and in permitting exclusion for past failure to comply with social and environmental 
contract obligations under less strict conditions than is provided for under EU law154. Finally, 
regardless of any general need for a link to the subject matter, the GPA derogations may ensure 
wider scope for social or environmental policies than is possible under the EU Directives; in 
particular, the derogation relating to persons with disabilities and philanthropic institutions could 
allow for various mechanisms to be used in support of opportunities for those groups which are not 
possible under the EU regime, including price preferences and direct awards155.   
EU law also imposes certain obligations relating to social and environmental procurement, including 
under the Directives. Thus the 2014 Public Contracts Directive, for example, includes an obligation to 
ensure that suppliers comply with various applicable social and environmental laws and 
international conventions156;  an obligation to take into account accessibility considerations and 
design for all users157; a requirement to give reasons for not dividing procurement into lots (to 
support SMEs)158; and an obligation to exclude undertakings with convictions for certain offences of 
EU concern159 or adjudicated to be in default with tax or social security payments160. These 
obligations the UK would also be free to disregard after Brexit under a GPA-only regime161. 
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161 Other key obligations, imposed outside the framework of the Directives,  include obligations to take into account energy 
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Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC Text [2012] L 315/1, Art.6(1). 
The (possibly) greater scope for promoting policy goals through procurement under GPA-only 
coverage and award procedures, as described above, may be attractive to policy-makers both in 
Westminster and in the devolved jurisdictions, as well as to contracting authorities, particularly local 
authorities. In the late 1980s and 1990s UK central government was largely hostile towards, and at 
best unenthusiastic about, this use of procurement, both on its own account and in its view of the 
place of such goals in the procurement of sub-central entities. The latter concern culminated in the 
1988 Local Government Act which significantly restricted local authorities’ use of procurement as a 
policy tool162.  However, in recent years the climate has changed and the policy dimension of public 
procurement has become of increasing political and practical importance in all UK jurisdictions, one 
prominent feature being support for SMEs and the voluntary and community sectors. This has been 
reflected, in particular, in legislation imposing positive duties to consider using procurement as a 
policy tool. Thus the s.149 of the Equality Act 2010 (applicable in England and Wales and in Scotland) 
imposes broad obligations on all public purchasers to promote equality (gender equality, racial 
equality etc) in the exercise of their functions, which includes public procurement; the Public 
Services (Social Value) Act 2012, applicable in England (and in Wales to authorities that do not 
mainly or wholly exercise devolved functions) requires public purchasers awarding larger services 
contracts to consider how what is being procured might improve the social, economic and 
environmental well-being of their area; whilst in Scotland there is now, as mentioned above, a 
general duty of sustainable procurement under the Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014, s.9(1), 
for all but the smallest contracts, modelled to a degree on the Public Services (Social Value) Act 2012 
and referring specifically to improving the economic, social, and environmental wellbeing of the 
authority's area, facilitating the involvement of small and medium enterprises, third sector bodies 
and supported businesses, and promoting innovation. 
A GPA-only regime would, inter alia, allow the UK Governments to give their procuring entities 
greater flexibility in carrying out these duties by removing current restrictions that limit measures 
taken to those relating to the contract163. It could also result in significantly greater flexibility with, 
for example, lower value procurement covered by the duty of sustainable procurement in Scotland - 
which would be unregulated at international level - including to allow support of local SMEs and 
voluntary organisations. However, it is impossible to predict the extent to which current laws and 
practices would actually be modified. For example, there is a certain tension between, on the one 
hand, policies supporting SMEs and voluntary organisation and, on the other hand, other policies 
(environmental policies, preventing discrimination etc) which often involve increased bureaucracy 
and costs and which can have a disproportionate effect on these same SMEs and voluntary 
organisations. This consideration, the need to balance the benefits of policies with other costs164, 
and the uncertainty over the legal position under the GPA could well led to the maintenance of 
current restrictions on policies that go beyond the contract being awarded. So far as low value 
procurement is concerned, there could be significant political impetus for local or regional 
protectionism. This could be significantly detrimental to national welfare, and might end up being 
restricted through agreements by and between Westminster and the devolved administrations (as it 
is already under domestic law for some authorities under s.17 of the 1988 Local Government Act). 
Whilst many of the EU-level restrictions on using procurement as a national policy tool in the social 
and environmental context are, it is submitted, unjustified in light of the appropriate balance 
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between trade considerations and national discretion165, caution would be needed over the use of 
this tool in a less restrictive international environment166. 
4.5. The implications of a GPA solution: award procedures 
Conversely, it is submitted that so far as contract award procedures are concerned, the greater 
flexibility afforded by a GPA-only regime presents an important opportunity to improve the national 
regime, and that this in fact provides a strong argument for the UK to favour a GPA-only approach 
should this be available167.  
In this regard the author has already argued prior to the 2014 revisions for reform of the EU’s own 
regime to introduce real simplicity and flexibility168. To reduce complexity and uncertainty it was 
argued that the EU should regulate procurement through a single instrument that establishes a 
single set of procedures for all major procurement (thus eliminating both differences in rules and 
boundary disputes) and that, both to this end and to provide the most appropriate balance between 
national and EU objectives by increasing flexibility, this instrument should take as its starting point 
the procedural rules of the pre-2014 Utilities Directive. The arguments for such an approach at EU 
level remain following the 2014 reforms. Whilst the reforms have to some extent addressed the 
flexibility issue, in particular by extending scope for procedures that involve some negotiation169, at 
the same time they have reduced flexibility in certain ways including, arguably, by limiting 
negotiation after final tenders170. In any case, the very fact that the core public sector regime of the 
2014 Public Contracts Directive is now closer to that of the other directives171 actually makes the 
further step of a single Directive both more justified and easier to achieve. Further, complexity and 
uncertainty have been further exacerbated by the reforms – for example, by the reforms to 
competitive dialogue and the old negotiated procedure with a notice, which leave the difference 
between, and purpose of, those procedures rather unclear172; by the introduction of additional 
detailed and poorly drafted provisions – for example, on award criteria173; and by the adoption of 
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the separate Concessions Directive, despite the fact that from the perspective of award procedures 
it is not possible in the author’s view to distinguish concessions from other complex contracts174.    
Leaving aside the issue of EU-level reform, however, a GPA-only approach for the UK would enable 
the UK to reform its own procurement regime in this direction, and to address many of the problems 
that arise from the obligation to apply the EU regime.  Under this approach the UK jurisdictions 
could choose to regulate using a single instrument with largely identical award procedures, with the 
advantages that entails, while maintaining an approach that is sufficiently flexible to meet 
commercial needs.  
This arises, first, from the fact that the GPA itself - similar in this regard to the early Directives175 - is a 
relatively simple and streamlined instrument, which to a large extent provides a single set of rules 
for all covered procurement, although there are some stricter rules for central government176 
(including on means of advertising and time limits)177. Domestic legislation implementing the GPA 
could simply follow this single streamlined approach. Greater standardisation than exists at present 
is, of course, possible in the UK even under EU rules. However, this can be achieved only by adopting 
stricter rules than necessary for some entities and contracts (those covered by the utilities, 
concessions and defence rules) along the lines of the 2014 Public Contracts Directive, which is 
undesirable. In any case, the scope for doing this has been reduced by the 2014 reforms – for 
example, these reforms limit the possibility for Member States to preclude contracting entities from 
using all of the competitive award procedures, arguably limiting the possibility of aligning 
procedures between the different regimes178. A GPA-only framework, however, allows for a single 
and simple approach within a sufficiently flexible framework.     
This links with the second advantage of a GPA-only regime which is that the UK jurisdictions could, if 
they wished, increase flexibility for procurements currently covered by the 2014 Public Contracts 
Directive. The author’s view is that for the UK a regime based very broadly179 on the framework of 
the Utilities Directive – the minimum standard for procedures which the author has proposed for the 
EU regime and which in any case follows for the most part from the requirements of the GPA - is the 
most appropriate (although this would not be the case for every Member State were such flexibility 
given at EU level). This would, in particular, allow all entities to require registration on qualification 
systems as a mandatory condition of participation and as the basis for selecting participants, with 
the benefits that entails180; greater use of procedures involving negotiations outside the constraints 
of the (rather unclear) grounds in Art.26(4) of the 2014 Public Contracts Directive, eliminating the 
caution that may be induced by uncertainty; and access to procedures involving significant 
possibilities for negotiation after the final tender stage, which is useful for major and novel 
projects181.  
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Such an approach would ensure compliance with GPA requirements in a manner that is cost-
efficient, because familiar to stakeholders, in terms of the award procedures used - open procedure, 
restricted procedure, negotiated procedure with prior publication and negotiated procedure without 
prior publication – but without departing significantly from the traditional domestic starting point of 
regulating public procurement through non-legal means. In this regard, clarification that these 
procedures are based on those of the Directives, as interpreted in the case law, would enhance 
certainty. There is, it is submitted, no need to include the innovation partnership procedure 
introduced by the 2014 Directives, since the function of this procedure is already met by the 
negotiated procedure with prior publication182; its value is largely symbolic in highlighting the 
desirability of promoting innovation, and not worth the cost of unnecessarily complicating the 
legislation. Consideration might be given to including competitive dialogue for complex contracts, 
since the tighter discipline involved in this procedure at the post-tender stage as compared with the 
negotiated procedure with prior publication has proved beneficial183. However, another approach 
would be to encourage this tighter discipline within the negotiated procedure guidance, using 
guidance rather than legal regulation. 
As regards detail of the procedural steps, this also should in general be provided only at the level of 
the 1990 or 2004 Utilities Directives, although adapted to some extent to follow the language of the 
2012 GPA. For example, permitted award should be set out by reference to the GPA concepts of 
“lowest price” and “most advantageous tender” (rather than taking the convoluted and confusing 
approach of the 2014 Directives) with an explicit reference to the requirement for a link to the 
subject matter of the contract (taken from the 2004 Utilities Directive) if this requirement is 
considered desirable. However, legislation should exclude the detailed elaboration of this found in 
the 2014 Directives concerning use of criteria relating to experience and the possibility of taking into 
account all stages of the life-cycle184; if clarification is needed it should be given in guidance which 
can be easily amended and should certainly avoid the uncertainties of the language used in the 2014 
directives.  
So far as notices are concerned, the possibility might be considered of negotiating with the EU for 
continued use of the Official Journal of the European Union (OJ), subject to a contribution towards 
costs, ensuring that information on UK contracts is shown in OJ searches, and that key information is 
available in all EU languages. However, the latter is probably a marginal issue given the widespread 
knowledge of English and this approach would also involve continued use of the EU’s cumbersome 
standard forms. Not using the OJ for UK contracts would also not preclude UK access to information 
from Member States, since the information is publicly available. Thus requiring publication only 
through national media, such as ContractsFinder, may be a better solution, although possibly making 
use of EU tools such as the CPV where useful.   
One issue deserving specific mention is the principle of transparency, which is an explicit principle of 
the EU directives185 and also applies under the free movement rules186. One aspect of this principle 
that gives rise to significant practical difficulties is that it requires all conditions and detailed rules of 
the procedure to be drawn up in the contract notice or contract documents in a manner that is 
“clear, precise and unequivocal” so that, first, “all reasonably informed tenderers exercising ordinary 
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care can understand their exact significance and interpret them in the same way and, secondly, the 
contracting authority is able to ascertain whether tenderers satisfy the criteria”.187 It appears that 
this requirement, as interpreted in the domestic courts by the Inner House of the Court of Session 
and by the Supreme Court in Healthcare at Home, means that if a reasonably well informed and 
diligent tenderer (“RWIND” tenderer) could understandably and plausibly have construed criteria in 
different ways, then those criteria are insufficiently transparent188. In this regard, the courts appear 
to have rejected the view taken at first instance by Lord Hodge that such a standard is unrealistic, as 
impracticable in the case of complex contracts, and should therefore be rejected189. In the present 
author’s view, allowing a procuring entity to act on any reasonable interpretation provides a better 
balance between transparency and the interest in the smooth flow of the procurement process, 
provided that where there is more than one reasonable interpretation there is clarification on 
request of the way in which the provisions will be applied. Whilst the GPA contains, in Art.IV.4, a 
general obligation to conduct procurement in a “transparent” manner, the exact requirements of 
this have not yet been elaborated, and in the absence of further elaboration a GPA-only regime is 
likely to provide more scope for the UK courts to develop a more balanced approach.  
 
Procedures based broadly on the earlier Utilities Directives would not go much beyond the GPA 
requirements and, as noted above, would not involve a change to the traditional UK approach of 
regulating by legally binding rules only insofar as is actually required by international obligations. 
Whilst detailed consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, it is this author’s view 
that this is the right approach, in that very detailed regulation through legal means does not provide 
the best tool to achieve a balance between different procurement objectives190. It would 
nevertheless be useful to include provisions on some additional matters, based on those of the 2014 
Utilities Directive, which largely serve to adapt procedures to specific contexts. These should include 
rules on electronic auctions191; these appear to work well and to create few problems192. They could, 
however, be slightly adjusted to deal with some problematic aspects, notably the requirement to 
disclose all current rankings rather than just which is the winning bid, which may facilitate 
collusion193. It would also be useful to include rules on dynamic purchasing systems, the 2014 
rules194 being a significant improvement on those of 2004195; and on framework agreements, those 
of the 2014 Utilities Directive being clearer and providing a better balance between discretion and 
transparency than those of the 2004 Utilities Directive.  Rules on mandatory electronic procurement 
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might also be considered. (Those on electronic catalogues196, on the other hand, should not be 
included, since they largely repeat, rather than clarify, the general rules of the directives applicable 
to such matters.) Doing this this would go beyond the simple minimum requirements of the GPA 
itself, and to that extent is a departure from the approach to implementation adopted for the 
Directives. However, it would provide useful additional controls and certainty in areas that are not 
addressed at all, or are addressed only in a skeletal manner (as with auctions197) in the GPA, using 
rules familiar to stakeholders.  
Clarification on some issues, such as the principles governing changes to pre-stated award criteria 
and procedures - which should be permitted provided they are not material - might also be useful. 
However, these clarifications should be made through guidance wherever possible, to ensure 
flexibility in both application and amendment.  
Whilst reform of the UK regimes along the above lines is highly desirable, however, and itself a good 
reason to push for procedures based on the GPA only, it is probably not realistic prior to GPA 
accession; if, as appears possible, no general trade EU-UK trade agreement is concluded at the time 
of Brexit, and the UK applies for GPA accession at that point, it will probably be expedient to 
maintain the current – EU based – regulations. This will provide a simple means of demonstrating 
GPA-compliance and will speed up accession negotiations, which will be delayed by the need, first, 
for drafting of any new legislation rules and, secondly, by the need for it to be scrutinised for 
compliance by other GPA Parties. Even if Bartels is correct that accession is not required, this may be 
disputed by the other Parties and in practice existing regulations will also need to be maintained 
pending resolution of the UK’s status. Further, maintenance of the existing regulations will be 
expedient anyway if the prospect of an ultimate agreement with the EU based on EU procedures is 
at least not ruled out at the time of Brexit, since the regulations may then be needed in the end to 
fulfil the requirements of any eventual agreement with the EU. Thus it is likely that any reform along 
the lines proposed above will be a long term project. 
It is also relevant finally to note that if TTIP includes not just extended coverage but also 
development of common award procedures beyond what is provided by the GPA, any UK-US 
agreement on TTIP terms would, of course, necessitate the UK going beyond GPA procedures to that 
extent. 
4.6. The implications of a GPA solution: supplier remedies 
As mentioned, the GPA also sets minimum standards for supplier remedies (in GPA 2012 Art. XVIII), 
which are more flexible than those of the EU in some respects. It is uncertain how the UK regimes 
would react to this increased flexibility, but a few comments may be offered. 
First, perhaps the most significant change under a GPA-only approach would be the absence of a 
standstill requirement, a requirement which has contributed to an increased level of complaints and 
challenge in the UK198. It is far from clear that one or more of the UK jurisdictions would not decide 
to retain this requirement and this is arguably desirable: it has the laudable aim of promoting 
resolution of disputes before a contract is concluded, does not seem to cause particular problems, 
and is included in the 2011 UNCITRAL Model Law199. It is pertinent to mention that in the initial UK 
consultation on implementing the CJEU’s Alcatel decision200, which clarified the need for an effective 
set aside remedy, consultees expressed a preference for an ineffectiveness remedy for a short 
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period post-contract to a pre-contract standstill, to limit delay solely to challenged procurements201. 
This was in the end rejected as possibly inconsistent with EU law. A post-Brexit GPA-only regime 
would not preclude this approach. However, preferences may be different now that the UK has 
experience of standstill requirements, and it is perhaps more likely that either standstill will be 
retained or nothing put in its place.   
Another recent change to EU remedies law, which has again contributed to a recent increase in 
challenge and complaints202 but is not required by the GPA, is the provision for suspension of 
conclusion of the contract to be automatic rather than requiring specific action by suppliers. It is not 
clear whether or not the UK would wish to retain this if no longer obliged to do so under EU law.  
The possibility for a supplier at least to obtain suspension on request is required by the GPA203, on 
the other hand. It is arguable that the UK’s current approach to suspension does not comply with the 
effectiveness principle of the EU Remedies Directive, in view of the “adequacy of damages” 
condition, consideration of cross-undertakings in damages and limited weight given to the interests 
of EU law in the balance of convenience204; and in light of the European Commission’s recent focus 
on remedies, UK rules on suspension might have been challenged by the Commission were it not for 
the outcome of the Brexit referendum. However, it is much less clear whether such an approach is 
precluded by GPA requirements. The GPA generally requires that remedies be effective205, but this 
effectiveness requirement has yet to be elaborated. This weakens its de facto impact. Even if it is 
intended to create binding obligations at all, it is perhaps unlikely to impose the same constraints as 
the well-developed EU principle. This may reduce the incentive for change to the UK suspension 
rules. On the other hand, it is not impossible that the EU might take up this issue when considering 
whether the UK system complies with the GPA for the purpose of the UK’s GPA accession. 
As noted, other effects of a GPA-only solution would probably be to allow removal of any 
requirement for ineffectiveness for direct awards or (if standstill were adopted at all) for violation of 
that or for suspension requirements, as well as some relaxation of damages and set aside 
requirements. It is not clear how the UK would choose to react to such greater flexibility but 
certainly the possibility of removing damages for lost profits – which the UNCITRAL Model Law, like 
the GPA, makes optional206 – could be attractive.  
As regards the forum for review, on the other hand, whilst GPA obligations may in some respects be 
less stringent than those of EU law, for example regarding procedures and independence207, this is 
unlikely per se to have an impact given that the UK already chooses to use the courts208, rather than 
some more flexible approach, under EU law itself. It is in fact highly doubtful whether the use of the 
High Court as a forum for review in England and Wales and Northern Ireland complies with EU 
effectiveness requirements, at least without providing legal aid, given the cost of using this forum209. 
As with suspension it is not clear how the GPA’s own requirement for effective remedies would 
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affect this. However, even more so than suspension, there could be some possibility of the EU 
raising this issue in the context of the UK’s application for GPA accession. 
4.7. Greater fragmentation within the UK  
Finally, a possible consequence of a GPA-only solution is the potential for increased fragmentation of 
procurement law within the UK. Currently the Westminster Government has responsibility for 
international trade aspects of public procurement. It is also responsible for implementing EU law – 
including on procurement - in England and Wales210 and in Northern Ireland211, in which each EU 
Directive is implemented by a single common set of Regulations212.  Scotland has responsibility for 
implementing EU law in that jurisdiction213 and has its own separate procurement regulations for 
this purpose214, but has largely followed the Westminster approach to implementation although 
with some differences, more in implementing the 2014 directives than the 2004 directives. Other 
aspects of public procurement policy generally fall within the responsibility of the devolved 
administrations. However, as in other areas affected by EU law, EU obligations have significantly 
limited the scope for devolved policy-making: the existence of extensive common rules based on the 
Directives, which cover most key issues in the award process, has in practice meant a substantial 
degree of similarity in the public procurement law of the domestic jurisdictions. 
Moving from the EU system to a GPA-only system would, however, create a much greater space for 
the exercise of national discretion, which would be open to be filled by the devolved governments in 
light of their general jurisdiction over public procurement. As we will discuss further in the next 
section, divergence between the UK jurisdictions has recently increased even within the limited area 
left for national action by EU law, and this trend towards divergence seems very likely to be 
exacerbated by moving to a GPA-only regime which extends that area of action. This will potentially 
affect all three aspects of procurement policy discussed above. 
Thus there may be differences over whether and how to use legal tools to regulate procurement 
that is no longer covered by the international regime, including below-threshold procurement. In 
relation to industrial policy, we have already observed that there could be political pressures for 
regional and local protection, which may need to be addressed by and between the domestic 
Governments to avoid economic damage. In Canada efforts to deal with this issue have has led to 
the conclusion of an Agreement on Internal Trade215, which includes a chapter (Ch.V) on public 
procurement). (Some damage to internal trade may also, of course, result from the fragmentation 
process itself since lack of familiarity with the applicable procurement rules can deter tenderers216.) 
Increased fragmentation also seems likely in the area of social and environmental policy measures to 
the extent that there is any increased scope for such measures since, as we have seen, this is a 
particular area of interest at present for the UK legislators. In relation to award procedures, 
divergence may arise out of the greater scope for choices in the areas just discussed above, such as 
whether to use “EU” procedures at all (alternatives being to simply require procuring entities to 
follow GPA requirements or to invent new “domestic” procedures that fit the GPA framework), and 
which precise elements of EU procedures and techniques, if any, to retain or adapt alongside 
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minimum GPA requirements. Finally, in the area of remedies differences may occur over decisions 
such as whether to retain standstill, automatic suspension and ineffectiveness, and how to deal with 
damages.  
 
5. No trade agreements on procurement – a blank canvas: major change or not? 
5.1. Introduction 
Finally, we need to address the possibility that there will be no international trade agreements to 
constrain the procurement policy of the UK, either by choice or through failure of negotiations.  
Factors that may affect the UK’s decision whether to commit in principle to liberalising procurement 
have already been considered above in examining the GPA option, and it is much more likely that 
the UK will at least aim to be Party to the GPA. However, for completeness it is appropriate to 
comment briefly on what kind of procurement law might result from a blank canvas scenario.  
It is, in fact, very difficult to speculate but a few points can be made.  
5.2. Will the UK Governments continue to use legislation to regulate award procedures?  
A first point is that while the aim of EU procurement law is to open up markets, this EU law and the 
implementing UK regulations de facto also provide a system of transparent procurement procedures 
of the kind that countries often put in place to support value for money and anti-corruption 
objectives in procurement. A key question is whether without the constraints of EU law (or other 
trade agreements) the UK would altogether reject the use of law as a tool to achieve its 
procurement goals and revert to the traditional system that relies mainly on “administrative” 
regulation (which at central Government level means instructions and guidance to procuring entities 
from the Treasury and Cabinet Office).  
This is a possibility. However, it is notable that the UK jurisdictions have recently increasingly used 
legal rules that are enforceable by suppliers to pursue purely domestic procurement policies. Thus in 
the Westminster jurisdiction, the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 not only implement the 
obligations in the 2014 Public Contracts Directive, which require national legislation, but also 
include, in Part IV additional “domestic” rules217 designed mainly to help SMEs (the “Lord Young 
reforms”)218 which provide, inter alia, for further transparency (including national publication) and 
simplified qualification processes for contracts covered by the Directives; transparency (publication 
of information and response times) and simplified qualification rules for certain contracts below the 
Directive’s thresholds; and obligations relating to prompt payment of invoices. We have also seen 
that duties relating specifically to use of procurement as a policy tool are included in the Public 
Services (Social Value) Act 2012 for England and Wales. As noted above, s.39(1) of the Small 
Business, Enterprise and Employment Act also 2015 now gives to the Minister for the Cabinet Office 
or the Secretary of State a general power to make regulations on public procurement. In Scotland 
the Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 – driven mainly by a desire for a legal framework for 
using procurement as a policy tool, including to support SMEs – now provides a comprehensive 
framework for regulating public procurement in Scotland, covering both procurement above the EU 
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Directives’ thresholds and procurement below those thresholds219. All covered contracts are subject 
to some basic transparency obligations in the 2014 Act itself, as well as to obligations relating to 
sustainable procurement, as we have seen above; and the Act makes provision for further 
regulations and guidance.  
Of course, using legislation to regulate procurement for domestic reasons is far from entirely novel; 
in particular law was recently used to impose the (now repealed) regime on Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering (CCT) in local government220 and, as we mentioned above, to curtail use of procurement 
as a policy tool by local authorities (s.17 of the Local Government Act 1988). Further, local 
authorities have long been under a statutory obligation to regulate their own procurement 
procedures by standing orders221, which themselves have the force of law, although these rules, at 
least initially, have not been enforceable by aggrieved tenderers222. There have also historically been 
a variety of legislative provisions imposing (usually quite skeletal) tendering requirements for limited 
types of contract223. However, the recent extension of the “legal” approach in a significant way to 
central government is novel. Recent developments made possibly reflect a step-change towards 
accepting a wide role for law in regulating contract award procedures, which may have been 
influenced by the approach of EU law and prove to be a lasting legacy of EU membership.  
Also of possible significance for the future is the potential for regulation through judicial 
development. The Court of Appeal held in the Blackpool case in 1990 that there is an “implied 
contract” governing the tendering process224, and this implied contract has been invoked in other 
jurisdictions, notably Canada225, to ensure fair treatment of tenderers in a manner that supports key 
objectives of the procurement process. In JBW226 our own Court of Appeal effectively rejected any 
role for this doctrine for procurements regulated by the EU directives; the Court considered that no 
implied contract generally arises with these procurements, stating briefly that it would add nothing 
and be inconsistent with the directives’ purpose227 - reasoning that is neither logical nor internally 
consistent but which has the merits of ensuring certainty. Presumably the same approach would be 
taken to any GPA-based regime or other reasonably comprehensive legislative system. However, 
were the UK Governments to revert back to the administrative approach to regulation, the implied 
contract doctrine would take on greater potential importance. Moreover, it might well be invoked in 
practice more than in its early days given the increased familiarity of the domestic legal system and 
its lawyers with legal approaches to procurement. The courts have also sometimes applied judicial 
review principles to control procurement (although their approach - requiring a special element of 
“public law” for review - has been unsatisfactory and inconsistent228); but again there been little 
room for this mechanism in the context of procedures governed by extensive legislative rules229. 
However, again judicial review could take on a greater role in the absence of legislation. Piecemeal 
judicial development of rules would not necessarily, however, produce a satisfactory system, 
especially given the absence of judicial expertise, and would almost most certainly result in decades 
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of uncertainty. This background may influence the UK legislators to opt for a statutory system of 
basic regulation. 
Another element of the current background is the obligation referred to above for local authorities 
to make standing orders to govern their own procurement. These must include provision for 
securing competition for contracts for goods and works and for regulating the manner in which 
tenders are invited230. Even in light of the common EU framework for awarding major contracts 
there is significant variation in the standing orders of different authorities231 and clearly without such 
a common framework even more divergence can be expected. It is also worth mentioning that in 
1970 R. v Hereford Corporation Ex p. Harrower232 the High Court held that, whilst there was a legal 
duty to comply with the standing orders made and this duty could be enforced in the courts by 
ratepayers, it could not, however, be enforced233 by suppliers as an interest as a “competitor" was 
insufficient to give standing. It is likely, however, that interested suppliers would now have standing 
to sue under the “sufficient interest” test currently applicable in judicial review proceedings234. In 
the absence of other legislation to govern larger contracts, the courts might in future encounter 
legal actions based on standing orders, requiring the courts to interpret a variety of different 
provisions. A legislative regime laying down common rules for all authorities may well be considered 
preferable. 
All these considerations may influence decisions on how to regulate procurement after Brexit and it 
cannot be ruled out that the UK Governments will choose the tool of enforceable legislation to 
shape basic award procedures. The existing system already provides, as we have seen, for national 
publication rules to supplement EU-level publication obligations, as well as for certain controls over 
qualification processes. No doubt these will be retained under a purely national system, and could 
well be accompanied by national rules regulating other key procedural steps, even if not required by 
international obligations.  
5.3. An opportunity for better regulation 
It is pointless to speculate in detail at this early stage how any legislative systems of regulation might 
actually look in relation to the various aspects of procurement – industrial and social policy, and 
award procedures and remedies - were the UK Governments to be given a largely blank canvas. 
However, it was suggested above that the introduction of a GPA-only regime would provide an 
opportunity for better regulation of public procurement and clearly the absence of any external 
constraints at all would provide the same – or an even greater – opportunity for this. In the author’s 
view this would entail, as mentioned above, a single system for all procuring entities, and a system 
that is both simple and relatively flexible. As was suggested also for a GPA-based system and for the 
same reasons explained there, it is both desirable and quite likely that any new system would 
continue to use, for both coverage and procedural issues, terminology, concepts and rules based on 
those of EU law.  
However, as mentioned, the actual content of any new domestic system, and the extent to which it 
might be an improvement on the current system, is impossible to predict. Rather than producing a 
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more streamlined and otherwise improved approach it is also possible that a blank canvas could 
result in a complex patchwork of provisions, additional bureaucracy and/or poorly drafted and 
uncertain rules, which are arguably features of both some past domestic law, such as the former 
regime on Compulsory Competitive Tendering (rightly described as a “Frankenstein’s monster”235), 
and, to some extent, current provisions.   
A further improvement, it is submitted, would be to introduce a system of remedies that is available 
only when there is significant fault by a procuring entity, but which – as a quid pro quo – is also 
cheaper and easier to use than the current systems, so providing a better balance between costs and 
benefits of legal remedies.   
5.5. The fragmentation issue again 
Finally, related to the previous point of the potential for more complexity in the national system, it 
needs to be highlighted again that more regulatory space at the national level is likely to produce 
greater divergence between the rules of the different UK jurisdictions. This is likely to be very much 
more so with a complete absence of international rules than it is under a GPA-only system, since 
under the latter the essential core of the rules in the different jurisdictions will remain common. 
6. The timing of changes to the procurement regulations 
So far as timing is concerned, the UK will, of course, maintain the current regulations in place until 
Brexit actually occurs; the “Great Repeal Act” envisaged by the Prime Minister for 2017 will not have 
the effect of immediate repeal of all legislation implementing EU law, but is intended merely to 
“repatriate” the legal rules made under the European Communities Act 1972, with these rules only 
being removed, if at all, at appropriate times once EU membership ends. In practice Brexit will not 
occur for at least two years after the UK has invoked the procedure for leaving under Art.50 of the 
Treaty on European Union (two years being the period at which membership ceases in the absence 
of agreement to the contrary) - and longer if the EU Council agrees to extend negotiations. As 
mentioned earlier, the Prime Minister announced at the Conservative Party conference that the UK 
would invoke the Art.50 procedure by the end of March 2017. It is widely assumed that this will 
happen around that time rather than much before. However, there could be a delay even beyond 
this following the successful legal action to establish the need for Parliamentary approval for 
invoking the Art.50 procedure236, which is now being appealed to the Supreme Court, with the 
hearing due to start on 5 December 2016. Against this background there seems unlikely to be any 
Brexit, and hence any change in UK public procurement rules, until well into 2019, at least.  
 In fact, it is likely that the current rules will remain in place even longer, regardless of the eventual 
regime that is adopted. This is because it is likely that the eventual outcome of the trade 
negotiations that will shape the ultimate regime will not be known at the time of Brexit.  
First, negotiations with the EU itself are very likely to still be continuing at that point. If that is the 
case then the current regulations will surely be maintained pending resolution of the question of 
whether they will be required in the longer term; reasons for this could include to save scarce 
resources and to ensure that stakeholders remain familiar with the regime. It is possible also that 
the right to enforce the rules might be removed from EU suppliers if this were considered helpful to 
the UK’s negotiating position and/or the UK were unwilling to retain EU suppliers legal rights of 
access to UK procurement for this interim period without reciprocal commitments to UK suppliers237. 
However, complete repeal or temporary amendment (the latter of which would involve considerable 
resources) is not to be anticipated so long as negotiations with the EU remain outstanding. 
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Secondly, as we saw above, negotiations to accede to the GPA cannot even formally begin until the 
moment of Brexit. As we mentioned, even if at the time of Brexit there appears to be no prospect of 
concluding a bespoke agreement on procurement with the EU, it is still unlikely that the current 
regulations will be repealed until after accession, in order to speed up the accession process. It will 
not even be necessary to make temporary amendments to remove access of GPA suppliers pending 
reciprocation through GPA accession (or otherwise), since the access of GPA suppliers under the 
regulations expressly depends on whether reciprocal access is provided under the GPA or a 
comparable agreement. 
Thus it can be expected that even if they are not retained on a permanent basis the current 
procurement regulations will remain operative for many years - not just until the two years or more 
until Brexit but for some time thereafter, until negotiations with the EU and other GPA Parties are 
finally resolved. 
7. Conclusion 
All that can be said with reasonable certainty of the future of the UK public procurement regulations 
is that they will remain as they are until at least the time of Brexit. This will be at least two years 
after the UK invokes the procedure for leaving and longer if negotiations for Brexit are extended, 
meaning that current measures will stay in place until well into 2019. Further, if negotiations for a 
either a trade agreement with the EU and/or GPA accession are still on-going at the time of Brexit, it 
is likely that the current regulations will be retained at least until the outcome of those negotiations 
is determined.  
In the longer term, the impact of Brexit will depend mainly on the content of any trade agreements 
that are negotiated in place of current arrangements.  
First, were the UK to remain a member of the EEA, or to engage in a similar arrangement with the 
EU, the current public procurement rules would continue to apply in almost exactly the same way. 
The impact of Brexit on all the dimensions of procurement policy that we have addressed in this 
article – industrial, social/environmental and award procedures and remedies – would then be very 
limited, and UK industry would also continue to obtain the same access as now to EEA procurement 
markets. However, an important problem would be a significant loss of influence in shaping future 
changes to the rules. We have also suggested that centralised enforcement might not be so effective 
and may result in some current problems, such as defects in the UK remedies system, remaining 
unaddressed.  
Such an “EEA-type” outcome is still possible but it is perhaps not likely. However, we have seen that 
even without EU membership a trade agreement with the EU might involve broad and deep 
procurement regulation based wholly or largely on the current EU regime, in light of the EU’s general 
policy of including procurement in its trade agreements and a likely reluctance to accept a less 
stringent regime for the UK than applies in the EU itself. This outcome, also, may mean little change 
to procurement in the UK, although there is possibly potential for reduced obligations in certain 
respects – for example, low value procurement or hard defence procurement might be omitted from 
coverage. This would raise the prospect of using this procurement to promote and support industrial 
development, which could be politically attractive to the UK Governments and their procuring 
entities. However, it would certainly create economic dangers, not least of local and regional 
protectionism, which would need to be addressed. 
It is also possible, however, that the UK’s trade relationships in procurement with the EU, as well as 
with its other major trading partners, will be governed wholly or mainly by the GPA. Whilst it is 
generally (although not universally) considered that Brexit would entail the need to apply for GPA 
accession, the accession process should be straightforward, provided that it is supported by the EU. 
 A GPA-only regime would mean that international constraints would no longer apply to some utility 
contracts, hard defence contracts or concessions, or to low value contracts, raising again the 
prospect of using procurement as an industrial policy tool to some extent. A GPA-only regime would 
also entail much more flexibility for the UK in the area of award procedures, as well as less stringent 
remedy requirements. In the author’s view using the GPA’s more flexible model for award 
procedures opens up a golden opportunity to design a single, simple and much improved system of 
procurement rules for UK entities, and this in fact provides a strong argument for favouring a GPA-
only approach if this is available to the UK as a practical possibility. To reap the benefits of familiarity 
we have suggested that a new system should be modelled to a great extent on the 2004 Utilities 
Directives, although modified to include, in particular, more recent rules on frameworks and 
electronic procurement and also to take account of GPA terminology.  However, whether the UK 
would take this opportunity is open to debate. It is also likely that the benefits of any improvements 
within the UK jurisdictions would be offset to some extent by fragmentation between the 
jurisdictions arising from the greater regulatory space available to the different UK Governments as 
a result of the contraction of international rules. We may also possibly see greater use of 
procurement to promote social and environmental goals, using mechanisms that are ruled out by 
the current EU regime. However, the uncertainty of what the GPA rules allow in this regard may also 
mean that there is little change even in this area. 
Finally, there is a possibility, albeit rather slight, that Brexit would see UK procurement law free of 
international constraints – whether by choice or otherwise -  leaving the UK free to design its own 
systems. This could produce a return to the purely administrative approach to regulation or, 
alternatively, the “legal” approach made familiar by EU requirements could still be maintained - 
perhaps preferable to a piecemeal judicial development of regulatory rules which could emerge in 
the absence of a legislative regime. Should a legal framework be maintained, Brexit would again 
provide an opportunity for simplified and improved procedural rules within each UK jurisdiction 
which, again for reasons of familiarity, might be modelled to some degree on the EU regime.  The 
absence of international constraints would also offer the opportunity to create a supplier remedies 
system that offers a better balance between the costs and benefits of legal enforcement. Again, 
however, almost certainly there would be greater fragmentation between jurisdictions, and the 
dangers of internal protectionism would need to be addressed.  
Clearly, only time will reveal the future shape both of international constraints on public 
procurement and of the domestic reaction to any changes, and forecasts of the outcomes of Brexit 
for the various aspects of procurement policy covered in this article can at this stage only be highly 
speculative. The only certainties are that these are interesting times and that any ultimate changes – 
if they come at all – are still several years away.  
